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Recollection Bias and the Combat of Terrorism
W. Kip Viscusi and Richard J. Zeckhauser

ABSTRACT
Survey respondents assessed the risks of terrorist attacks and their consequences and were
asked how their assessments changed from before September 11 to the present. This paper
analyzes those current and recollected risk assessments. More than half of the respondents
exhibited what we labet "recollection bias": looking backward from 2002, 2003, or 2004, they
reported that their forward-looking risk assessments did not rise after September 11. However,
government expenditures and policies and evidence from insurance markets suggest that there
were major risk increases in estimated risks. Respondents were generally witting to support
airplane passenger profiling when the time costs of alternative policies were great and were
supportive of strengthened surveillance policies to address terrorism risks as well. However,
individuals suffering from recollection bias are less supportive. We labeL as "recollection choice
bias" a link between policy choices and recollection bias.

1. INTRODUCTION

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attack imposed devastating costs on
the United States and dramatically increased policy makers' assessments
of the likelihood and magnitude of future terrorist attacks. A series of
significant policy measures-such as the creation of the Department of
Homeland Security, more intensive airport inspections, and a war that
deposed the Taliban in Afghanistan-were taken to combat these risks.
The trade-offs involved in preventing terrorist attacks in the United
W. KIP viscusi is Cogan Professor of Law and Economics, Harvard Law School. RICHARD
J. ZECKHUASER is Ramsey Professor of Political Economy, Kennedy School of Government,
Harvard University. Viscusi's research is supported by the Harvard Olin Center for Law,
Economics, and Business. We are indebted to Jeffrey Brown and Miriam Avins for helpful
comments; to Anda Bordean, DeYett Law, and Paul Novosad for valuable research assistance; and to an insightful referee who led us to recast our paper. We are grateful to Kent
Smetters for conducting the study for us at the Wharton School.
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States are fundamental, yet often hard to grasp. While most policy tradeoffs balance money and some policy goal, combating terrorism often
creates conflicts between the fundamental attributes of safety and civil
liberties. Advocates on each side claim that the goal they favor cannot
be compromised, yet their claims frequently cannot be satisfied simultaneously. In addition, what policies are appropriate against terrorism
will depend importantly on probabilities as well as preferences. Policy
makers must implicitly make subjective assessments of risk to formulate
policies. Moreover, their policies will also be influenced by the public's
support, which in turn will depend on its perceptions of risks and of
the effectiveness of measures to control them.1
Terrorist risks-man-made events of low probability and high consequence-are hard to estimate, making decisions on how to respond
particularly prone to biases that are not entirely rational. While sound
policies should be based on carefully derived subjective estimates of the
risks and the ways those risks are affected by various measures, we
simply do not have a large data source telling us how the risk of a
terrorist attack would change with some change in policy.2 We lack
answers to questions such as, If we seek to reduce terrorism risks through
a variety of screening efforts with different levels of stringency, how will
this change the expected number of fatalities?
This paper addresses two major questions. First, what probability
judgments do people make about terrorism risk? Second, how do their
judgments relate to their preferences for policies that balance the risk
of terrorism against the cost of measures to reduce the risk?
We analyze the risk perceptions and policy preferences of groups of
relatively sophisticated citizens, professional school students at Harvard
University and undergraduate business students at the Wharton School
of the University of Pennsylvania. We examine these respondents' patterns of response and search for biases and irrational judgments. The
policy trade-offs involved in combating terrorism are more subtle than
the choices in most policy choice contexts.
Our three primary findings are the following: (1) More than two1. Of course, it was naive to assume such a low probability before September 11. For
example, the simultaneous successful bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, or indeed the unsuccessful 1993 World Trade Center bombing, should have led to
much higher estimates.
2. In contrast, we have plenty of information about car accidents. For everyday risks,
we get dozens or indeed many thousands of data points each year. Moreover, unlike terror
risks, gauging them does not require estimates of human intentions.
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thirds of respondents believe that their estimated risk of a future terrorist
attack did not rise from before September 11 to after September 11.
(2) Roughly three-quarters of respondents favor racial profiling in airports if the alternative is a 60-minute line. (3) There is significantly less
support for profiling among those who state that their estimate of future
terrorist risk did not rise after September 11.
How can we be confident that respondents' estimates of the risk of
a terrorist attack should have increased dramatically since September
11, despite sustained efforts against Al Qaeda and sister organizations
and generally tighter security in the United States? We rely on market
information and the estimates implicit in the choice of vigorous and
extremely expensive government antiterrorist policies, which possibly
may include the war in Iraq. For example, terror risks were excluded
from many new insurance policies after September 11. Difficulties in
securing such coverage, and dramatic escalation in proposed rates, eventually led to a 3-year government reinsurance program.3 In 2004, the
U.S. government is spending many tens of billions of dollars and implementing some unappealing policies to fight terrorism, which implies
that the returns from such measures are far greater after September 11
than was thought prior to it. In addition, an attack that cost 3,000 lives
and perhaps $100 billion in damage was beyond the expectation of
virtually all observers; this highly unlikely outcome greatly increases the
expected damages from subsequent successful attacks. Evidence on attention or inattention to terrorist risks by newspapers and national survey institutions is also instructive. For example, there were 51 articles
on terrorism from January 1, 2001, through August 31, 2001, in the
New York Times. The equivalent figures for 2002 and 2003 were 393
and 234.'
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses a statistical pro3. The dramatic effect this attack had on tightening insurance markets-one could buy
less coverage at higher prices-is documented by Brown et al. (2003), Cummins and Lewis
(2003), Doherty, Lamm-Tennant, and Starks (2003), and Smetters (2004). Prior to Sep-

tember 11, Chicago's airports had $750 million of insurance for a premium of $125,000.
Coverage after September 11 was reduced to $150 million and the premium raised to $6.9
million (Jaffee and Russell 2002, pp. 2-3). In the reinsurance program, the government

pays 90 percent above the insurance companies' deductible, which is 10 percent of a
company's premiums in 2004. Brown et al. (2003) and Smetters (2004) provide excellent
discussions of the legislation and of policy choices pertaining to insurance involving ter-

rorism. Other possible policy responses are explored by Keohane and Zeckhauser (2003)
and Kunreuther and Heal (2003).
4. Articles were researched through Lexis-Nexis. The pace through June 2004 is a bit

over half that for 2003.
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cedure for updating a risk after a catastrophe. It first describes the applicable methods of decision theory. It then presents a brief discussion
of recollection bias and introduces a model that analyzes how such bias
might reduce support for antiterrorism risk policies.
Section 3 details our assessment of individuals' beliefs about terror
risk and examines the determinants of such beliefs. It pays particular
attention to the possible influence of recollection bias.
Section 4 focuses on the key trade-offs in combating terrorism. Our
main case study addresses respondents' willingness to support targeted
passenger screening at airports, where the trade-off is between additional
waiting time for all passengers and targeting passengers according to
some demographic profile of potential terrorists. It focuses on recollection bias as an explanatory variable. Individuals who couple such bias
with the belief that policies before September 11 were optimal for that
time will feel that it is undesirable to compromise civil liberties now to
promote safety. This constellation of perceptions and beliefs produces
recollection choice bias.
Section 5 discusses qualifications to our study and suggests how some
concerns could be resolved in the future. The concluding Section 6 highlights a major finding: individuals' preferences among policies to combat
terrorism do not reflect current assessments of terror risks. Those preferences, however, are strongly influenced by whether they perceive that
the risk level has increased. If so, more aggressive policies are supported;
if not, they are not.

2. UPDATING RISK, RECOLLECTION BIAS, AND POLICY PREFERENCES

In estimating the risk of a catastrophe in a period, say, a month, one is
essentially estimating an unknown probability. As a reference case, assume that the underlying risk of catastrophe does not change from period
to period. Since the value of p is unknown, the subjectively perceived
risk of catastrophe should change over time. In any period when the
catastrophe does not occur, the estimated p declines; on the rare occasions when it does occur, the estimate increases dramatically.'
5. Such an updating process is often captured by a beta distribution with parameters
a and b, where the initial p is a/(a + b). After a nonoccurrence, it goes to a/(a + b + 1),
and after an occurrence, it goes to (a + 1)/(a + b + 1), with the process repeating the next
period. With the parameters a = .1 and b = 20, the initial likelihood of an attack in a
month would be 1/200. A month later, assuming no attack, the probability would be
1/210. But if there were an attack, the probability would jump to 11/210, a more than
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2.1. Recolection Bias and Hindsight Bias
Our surveys were conducted after the tremendous shock of September
11, so respondents were unlikely to recall what they thought the risk of
a major terrorist attack was before September
that many of our respondents never thought
many heart attack victims do not think about
have had a heart attack. Therefore, we needed

11. Indeed, we speculate
about that issue, just as
that possibility until they
to ask people to compare

their current estimates of risk with what they think their estimates were
prior to the catastrophe. While there is no conclusive way to learn what
our respondents' a priori estimates really were, we can compare the
patterns of their responses to those of their colleagues, to what Bayesian
analysis might suggest, and to changing external estimates of risk, such
as insurance rates for terror losses.
Our major conjecture is that many respondents will think that their
a priori risk estimates were much higher than they really were. That is,
their stated recollection of their pre-event probability and their assessed
postevent probability are too close together. We label this cognitive error
"recollection bias."
Recollection bias could be diagnosed easily if it was simply poor
updating of an unchanging probability. However, the probability will
likely shift. First, even if risk prevention measures are held fixed, actual
risk levels may change between the before and after period. For example,
whatever his risk perceptions may be, an individual who has had a heart
attack is at much higher risk than a medical peer-same age, cholesterol,
and so on-who has not. After an earthquake in a known zone, the
immediate earthquake risk diminishes. Terrorists may learn from past
attacks or gather new adherents and resources from successes. Second,
risk prevention measures may be increased after an unlikely bad outcome. Our heart patient may begin exercising. The United States and
some allies went after Al Qaeda after September 11. While we assert
that assessments of future terrorist risk should have increased noticeably
after September 11, there is no completely objective way to demonstrate
this, particularly since there are no surveys of the risk from before September 11 of which we are aware.
Recollection bias is a first cousin of the widely studied hindsight bias
10-fold increase. The model, and its assumption of a constant probability, is too simple
to capture the complexities of terror risks, but the qualitative result that estimated risk
should jump following an unexpected attack is robust.
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(Fischhoff 1975).' Hindsight bias states that after an unlikely event,
individuals will overestimate the extent to which the event was foreseeable. Like hindsight bias, recollection bias addresses individuals' ex post
assessments of their prior estimates. The most important difference is
that recollection bias compares ex post assessments to current estimates
of the risk going forward, not to actual prior estimates.
Studies of hindsight bias have not generally tracked risk beliefs over
time; rather, the approach has been experimental and typically has been
conducted across subjects. One group of subjects considers a hypothetical scenario that describes a situation before a risk event has occurred
and asks respondents to assess the risk. A second group of subjects
considers the risk event after the lottery has been run, where the outcome
such as an accident is known, and is asked what their preaccident risk
assessment would have been.7 Thus, the comparison is between assessed
risk when given an ex ante experimental scenario and assessed prior
risks when given an ex post experimental scenario. We cannot duplicate
this format for terrorism risks: we could hardly construct a credible
hypothetical scenario in which people are ignorant of the World Trade
Center attacks. As a result, we studied recollection bias: we compared
whether respondents' current assessments of the terrorism risk are
greater than they recollect that they were before the attack. The Appendix presents a schematic view of hindsight bias and of recollection
bias.
In addition to recollection bias, there are at least two other reasons
why people did not raise their estimates of the risk of a terrorist attack
after September 11. First, individuals might have thought that policy
measures, such as increased screening at airports or the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, lowered terror risks sufficiently to bring them to or
below September 11 levels.
Second, although the occurrence of such an extreme outcome of an
event with such a low and hard-to-estimate probability should significantly shift rationally computed risk beliefs, some people will simply
ignore the new information. Those whose risk beliefs did not change are
"resistant learners" who ignore information!
6. We thank a referee for encouraging us to look for a term that distinguishes our

concept from traditional hindsight bias.
7. In one version of the experiment, the same individuals are asked their values before
and after a hypothetical accident.
8. Resistant learning could result from respondents' anchoring their risk beliefs on
their preaccident risk assessments. An early discussion of anchoring appears in Tversky
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Figure 1. Terror risk versus civil liberties

2.2. Risk Assessments and Preferred Policies
Why might recollection bias arise? As with hindsight bias, individuals
might wish to magnify their own ability to assess the world. For example,
after the World Series, sports fans might believe that their prior estimates
of the winning team's prospects were far higher than were the Las Vegas
odds. Recollection bias might also be a product of motivated reasoning:
an individual who did not want to change policies might assert-even
to himself-that probabilities had not changed.
Figure 1 illustrates how risk perceptions might influence preferences
on civil rights and antiterror policies. The original set of trade-offs between civil liberties and expected terrorism losses is characterized by the
curve xx. As the level of civil liberties increases, one would expect higher
expected terrorism losses because screening of passengers and other antiterrorism efforts will be less vigorous in such a world. Individuals have
and Kahneman (1974). Resistant learning could have been expected here. In experimental
tests, Kelman, Fallas, and Folger (1998) found little evidence of hindsight bias for gambles
in which the risks were transparent. When the odds were more difficult to calculate, which
is surely the case with terrorist calamities, respondents tended to exhibit much more hindsight bias.
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indifference curves with respect to combinations of civil liberties and
terrorism losses, which are indicated by I , I2, I3, and 14 in the figure. All
individuals prefer lower levels of terrorism losses and higher levels of
civil liberties, so preferences take on a higher value moving in the southeasterly direction of the figure. The indifference curves are vertical offsets
of each other. This relationship implies, as would seem reasonable
though not inevitable, that the trade-off between lives and liberties does
not depend on the expected number of lives already lost. Given the
preferences indicated, the optimal choice before the September 11 attack
is at point A, offering expected losses of a.
After the terrorist attack on September 11, the trade-off curve between expected terrorism losses and civil liberties is characterized by
curve yy. For any given level of civil liberties, the expected terrorism
losses have increased because we have raised our assessed risks from a
terrorist attack. This curve is twisted upward: for any civil liberties level,
the yy trade-off curve is steeper than the xx curve. This tilting reflects
our assumption that a reduction in civil liberties, like any expensive
safety measure, reduces losses more when risks are high. It also reflects
the need for caution in a perilous situation. If we were to keep civil
liberties at their optimal pre-September 11 level at point A, we would
land at point C. Instead, the new optimal combination of civil liberties
and expected terrorism losses is at D. It provides for a lower level of
civil liberties than before, yet expected terrorism losses, at d, are greater.
What if individuals do not shift their risk estimates? Resistant learners, who fail to update their beliefs from September 11, will set risk
estimates well below those of the rest of the population. They would
wish to operate at A, as before September 11.
How would people who fall prey to recollection bias balance terror
risk and civil liberties after September 11? In recollection bias, although
a person's risk beliefs do not differ from those of the rest of the population, remembered ex ante beliefs are raised relative to current beliefs,
possibly even exceeding them. Let risk beliefs RA and R, represent ex
ante and ex post beliefs, with RA(i) being perceptions of ex ante views
at time i, where i = A, P, and similarly for R,(i). For expositional simplicity, we deal with the case in which ex post and remembered ex ante
beliefs are equal. That is, those suffering recollection bias have RA(P)
equal to R,(P). They believe that both before and after the attack they
were operating on curve zz and had chosen point B. Since they assume
that society behaved optimally before the attack and there is no change
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in risk after the attack, then there is no reason to move from point B.9
The associated civil liberties level remains at d.
2.3. Judgments of External and Internal Decisions
Individuals' judgments about the likelihood of a bad outcome may depend on who made the decision that might have affected the bad outcome. When individuals were external to decisions made before the lowprobability event occurred, if they never approved of them or were in
no way invested in them, then they will be termed "external." In making
normative judgments, they will be judging others, and their judgments
might suffer from hindsight bias. 1" This phenomenon is akin to what
Kelman, Fallas, and Folger (1998) refer to as "third-party hindsight bias"
in the risk perception context. For example, jurors in negligence cases
often indicate that they believe that risk levels were apparent to the
defendant before a significant accident and that the defendant should
have taken appropriate efforts to reduce these risks.
When individuals are judging their own past decisions or others' past
decisions of which they approved, we say they are internal, or invested.
Recollection bias is more likely to emerge with such decisions. Our
respondents composed a well-informed audience on government-citizen
relations. Virtually all of them were familiar with the broad sweep of
American civil liberties policies prior to September 11, and we suspect
that virtually all of them approved of the protections then in place. Thus,
we think of our respondents' decisions as being internal.
Our primary interest in this paper is forward-looking decisions, not
past decisions. We employ the term "recollection choice bias" to refer
to the tendency of recollection-biased individuals to favor different policies than other individuals with the same forward-looking probabilities.
9. There is an important distinction here with how hindsight bias would operate in
jurors deliberating about negligence. In that case, the juror never made a judgment about
the level of precautions taken. Hence, if he now believes the risk was higher than others
felt before, he can blame the responsible party for laxity. It is interesting to note that jurors
in experimental contexts have quite different attitudes to risk-taking decisions they are
asked to make ex ante and failed risky decisions others have made. See footnote 11. In
the terrorism case, we assume that respondents approved, as did virtually all Americans,
of the levels of civil liberties before September 11. Loss aversion could also be at play.
Given loss aversion in a situation with multiple attributes, it is far more costly to sacrifice
on one dimension than it is beneficial to gain on another. Hence, there is a tendency to
stick with the perceived status quo policy choice.
10. The potentially powerful role of hindsight bias with respect to assessments of
liability and punitive damages is documented by Rachlinski (1998), Hastie, Schkade, and
Payne (1999), Viscusi (1999), and Sunstein et al. (2002).
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People who are invested in past policies and who do not think that risk
levels have changed presumably judge past policies to be still optimal."
For example, two sedentary, overweight 60-year-old males, A and B,
each with high cholesterol and blood pressure despite medication, suffer
heart attacks. Each is told his risk of recurrence is substantial. A does
not want to change his ways. B wants to follow a stringent diet and
exercise regime. Presumably, B has appropriately raised his assessment
of risk given his old bad lifestyle. A, by contrast, may well exhibit recollection choice bias; his estimates before and after may be too close.
He believes that he always knew he was at high risk, so the heart attack
may not justify a change in policies.

3. THE DETERMINANTS OF RISK BELIEFS

The discussion below draws on three surveys from students at Harvard
Law School, Harvard's Kennedy School of Government, and the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania. The first survey was run
at Harvard Law School in April 2002 and had a sample size of 95
students, most of them first-year law students. The second survey was
taken by 56 Harvard Law School students who were in their second or
third year and 61 Kennedy School students in November 2003, for a
total 2003 sample of 117. The third survey was completed in March
2004 by 122 Wharton School students; roughly 90 percent were undergraduates. Respondents considered a written survey instrument and
2
were assured of the confidentiality of their responses.
3.1. Recotlection Bias Measures
Although actual risk beliefs are of interest and are reported, our principal
concern is recollection bias. We assessed this bias with respect to ter11. Respondents' policy preferences may have influenced their stated risk beliefs. If
they do not wish to allow new curbs on civil liberties, they convince themselves or state
that current risk levels are no higher than those before the salient event. They adjust
remembered ex ante levels upward to achieve this equality. However, the survey questions
were not framed in a manner that would foster such an effect.
12. The law students were enrolled in Viscusi's classes "Analytical Methods for Lawyers" in 2002 and "Economics of Regulation and Antitrust" in 2003. The Kennedy School
students were masters and doctoral students in Zeckhauser's elective course "Analytic
Frameworks for Policy." The Wharton students were in Kent Smetters' course "Risk Management and Insurance."
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Table 1. Percentage Change in Terrorist Risk Estimates after September 11
2002
Sample'
(N

Risk is now higher
Risk is same as before
September 11
Risk is now lower

= 94)

2003
Sample'
(N

= 117)

2004
Sample'
(N

Pooled
Sample

= 122)

(N

= 333)

43

54

33

43

17
40

24
22

34
33

26
31

. Harvard Law School, where 95 people were surveyed but there were only 94 responses to this question.
56 at Harvard Law School, 61 at Harvard Kennedy School.
University of Pennsylvania Wharton School.

rorism by asking the following question:

13

Take yourself back to the World Trade Center disaster. Do you believe that
the risk of a terrorist attack over the next year on an airplane is higher or
lower than you thought it was before the September 11th disaster?
Higher

The Same

__

Lower

_

The results, reported in Table 1, are startling. A substantial fraction
of respondents-57 percent in the pooled sample-believed that the risk
was lower or the same as what they remember they thought it was before
the attack. 4 In regressions reported below, the variable September 11
recollection bias will take on a value of one if the respondent believed
the risks were the same or lower than they were before the attack and
a value of zero otherwise.
To see if recollection bias was peculiar to the terrorism case or in
fact generalized to less emotionally charged issues, we asked our 2003
and 2004 respondents about their updating of space shuttle risks after
the 2003 Columbia disaster. The question posited that no new precautions were taken. An external indicator that the perceived risk had risen
13. As we observe in Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2003, p. 108), until September 11 there
had been very few fatalities resulting from hijackings of U.S. aircraft since 1970: "In 1973,
30 people died as a result of a terrorist action while a Pan Am flight from Rome was
loading at the gate. The 1985 hijacking of a TWA flight from Athens resulted in the death
of one U.S. serviceman. In 1986 a hijacking of a Pan Am flight from Karachi, Pakistan led
to 16 fatalities. The largest death toll from a pre-9/11 hijacking was the 43 people who
were killed as a result of the hijacked Pacific Southwest flight by a former employee."
14. In the 2003 survey, fewer thought the risk was lower than in the 2002 survey.
There was no terrorist attack in the United States between the two survey times, which
should have lowered risk estimates. On the other hand, the war in Iraq probably raised
them.
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is that NASA suspended all shuttle flights until the safety issues were
resolved. Here 55 percent thought their risk estimate would be unchan-

ged; 6 percent thought it would be lower, and 39 percent higher. The
61 percent of the people who estimated risks to be unchanged or lower
show recollection bias.

3.2. Determinants of Terrorism Risk Assessments
The respondents also considered a series of questions asking them to
assess the likelihoods of various death tolls from terrorism attacks. Their
answers were taken to be a measure of individuals' probabilistic risk

beliefs. Below, we analyze how recollection bias regarding the World
Trade Center attack influences risk beliefs and whether both recollection
bias and risk beliefs affect attitudes toward protective measures against
terrorism. The questions on risk beliefs are as follows:
Based on some estimates, the September 11, 2001 disaster led to 266 deaths in
the planes and 2,717 deaths at the World Trade Center. The total number of
deaths was about 3,000. Below is a series of questions about the number of
deaths on the ground and to passengers in the U.S. in the next 12 months because
of attacks by foreign terrorists on airplanes.
a. Think of the best outcome in which the number of terrorism deaths could be
low. Suppose there is only one chance in 20 that the number of terrorism
deaths could be at this low level or below. What is your estimate of this lowend death toll in the U.S.?
b. Now think of the worst outcome. Suppose there is only one chance in 20
that the number of terrorism deaths could be this high. What is your estimate
of this high-end death toll in the U.S.? __
c. Your best estimate of the actual death toll will be somewhere between your
estimate of the low-end death toll and your estimate of the worst death toll.
What is your best estimate of the expected number of terrorism deaths over
the next 12 months in the U.S.?
d. If we were to average the best estimate of your classmates of the terrorism
death toll in the U.S., that is, their answers to part c, what number do you
think we will get?
e. If a plane with 300 passengers were shot down by terrorists at the London
Heathrow Airport, what would your best estimate be of the number of deaths
on the ground and to passengers in the U.S. in the following 12 months
because of attacks by non-U.S. citizens on airplanes? Do not count any passengers killed in this attack. __
A second version of the survey, given to different respondents, was
identical except that instead of the risks arising solely because of attacks
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Table 2. Terrorism Risk Estimates of Fatalities in Next 12 Months: 2003 and 2004 Survey
Results Combined

Airplane risk:
Lower bound (5th percentile)
Upper bounda (95th percentile)
Best estimates (50th percentile)
Estimates of classmates
Post-London attack estimate
Multiple risks:
Lower bound (5th percentile)
Upper bound' (95th percentile)
Best estimates (50th percentile)
Estimates of classmates
Post-Los Angeles attack estimate
Pooled survey estimate:
Lower bound (5th percentile)
Upper bound' (95th percentile)
Best estimates (50th percentile)
Estimates of classmates
Postattack estimate

Median

Mean

S.E.M.

1.5
2000
100
200
100

95.95
23,768.35
451.59
706.45
408.39

33.71
12,658.61
99.98
116.02
77.50

5
4000
100
200
100

64.31
33,419.97
341.75
1,306.87
255.08

26.14
12,657.38
65.96
819.23
45.17

5
3000
100
200
100

79.73
28,762.01
395.52
1,012.94
328.80

21.18
8,942.09
59.39
421.62
44.22

Note. S.E.M. = standard error of the mean.
' Eight observations with estimates of over I million were excluded from these statistics,
as was another observation with incomplete information.

by non-U.S. citizens on airplanes, it also included "violent terrorist attacks by non-U.S. citizens more generally, e.g., crashed airplanes, bombs,
and bullets." This expanded set of outcomes was designed to test for
possible embedding effects. Embedding occurs when two or more risks
are combined in a class, and the total estimated risk for the class falls
far below the sum of the individual risks."5
Table 2 reports the responses to these questions in 2003 and 2004
for respondents considering airplane risks alone or multiple risks from
terrorism (similar results for 2002 for several of these variables appear
in Viscusi and Zeckhauser [2003]). The responses for airplane risks and
multiple risks are very similar, as the subsequent regression results will
also indicate. While some of the multiple-risk responses are greater than
for airplane risks alone, others are not, and none of these observed
differences are statistically significant. There is no evidence that people
regard the hazards of multiple risks as being noticeably greater than the
15. As long as the risks are small, the possibility that two or more may occur in the
same period does not reduce the total probability much. Kahneman and Knetsch (1992)
discuss the embedding phenomenon.
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risks posed by airplane risks alone. This failure to distinguish between
one risk and a class of risks in which it is included is a classic embedding
effect. Given its appearance, we pool the results for airplane risks and
multiple risks and consider the pooled estimates at the bottom of the
table.
The first set of results pertains to the lower-bound estimate, or what
the respondents were told was the 5th percentile of their risk distribution
for terrorism fatalities. The mean value for this is 80. The second set of
values pertains to the 95th percentile of that distribution, which is the
high-end risk estimate (the potential for alarmist responses to such a
risk information situation is discussed in Viscusi [1997, 1998]). For the
2003 and 2004 sample, this mean value is 28,762.
The third estimate presented is the respondent's best estimate of the
risk. While the survey did not indicate whether the "best estimate"
should be the mean value or the median, the previous survey questions
were in terms of percentiles of the distribution, which would be consistent with assessing the median. The best-estimate responses were much
closer to the low end than were some average of high and low estimates,
which suggests that respondents did in fact think in terms of the median,
which we will assume for the following discussion.1 6 The mean of these
median terrorism death tolls was 396. Even on a logarithmic basis, this
value is closer to the lower-bound estimate than to the upper-bound
worst case. Individuals' loss estimate distributions appear to have a long
right tail. Respondents' best estimate of their classmates' estimates of
terrorism risk are higher than their own estimates of the risk; respondents
believe others will assess the risk as being greater than they do.
Finally, the survey included questions about how the respondent's
best estimate of the risk would change were an airplane to be shot down
by terrorists, killing 300. The scenario reported in the top section of
Table 2 was a terrorist attack at London Heathrow Airport, and the
scenario in the middle section was an attack on Los Angeles Airport.
Our hypothesis was that an attack in the United States would have
greater impact; however, the risk estimates after attacks at the two airports are quite similar, with identical median values and somewhat
higher means for a London attack. More surprising, the numbers hardly
rise above the individuals' previous best estimates of terrorism risk. This
16. Indeed, since the upper-bound estimate is only the 95th percentile and the estimates
were substantially skewed to the right, the mean estimate should be well above the average
of the 5th and 95th percentiles.
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Table 3. Tobit Results of Best Estimate of Terrorism Risk
Without Demographics

Lower bound
Upper bound
Multiple risks
September 11
recollection bias
2003
2004 (Wharton)
Female

With Demographics
Log
Equation'

Linear
Equation

Log
Equationa

Linear
Equation

1.8055"
(.1707)
.0004
(.0004)
26.2666
(97.4742)

.4873*
(.0456)
.2689*
(.0438)
-. 0495
(.1765)

1.7980"
(.1706)
.0004
(.0004)
32.3010
(97.4542)

.4858*
(.0474)
.2569*
(.0446)
-. 0420
(.1761)

-1.8486
(100.1616)
-70.0136
(123.7554)
71.9063
(121.6734)
. . .

-. 2000
(.1837)
-. 1982
(.2239)
.2361
(.2251)
. . .

-15.8305
(101.5873)
-187.7072
(155.5459)
98.9954
(126.4293)
260.0589'
(105.6914)
-27.7425
(111.8196)
-101.5829
(133.9680)
190.2480
(170.4961)

-. 2266
(.1855)
-. 5231'
(.2787)
.2959
(.2318)
.2694
(.1915)
-. 2937
(.2087)
-. 3030
(.2423)
.5055
(.3073)

Nonwhite

. . .

U.S. citizen

. . .

Kennedy School

.. .

Note. Each equation also contains a constant term. Standard errors are in parentheses.
' The natural logarithm is taken of the best estimate, lower bound, and upper bound,
where all are +1.
+ Statistically significant at the 10% level, two-tailed test.
* Statistically significant at the 5% level, two-tailed test.

hypothetical attack barely budges risk estimates. Such inertia could reflect resistant learning, or perhaps people do not change risk perceptions
17
much in response to hypothetical events.

To analyze the determinants of the best estimates of terrorism risks,
we prepared Tobit estimates regressing those estimates on other aspects
of risk beliefs, as shown in Table 3. These Tobit results jointly estimate
the influence of whether the respondent assesses a nonzero level of terrorism deaths and an estimate of the scale of these deaths. The first set
of results includes only risk variables, survey year dummy variables, and
survey group variables; the second set also includes important demo17. A weakness of many hindsight bias studies is that they ask questions about hypothetical happenings.
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graphic variables. For each set, we estimate both a linear equation in
which the dependent variable within the Tobit framework is the subject's
best estimate of the terrorism risk and an equation in which the dependent variable is the logarithm of the subject's best estimate.
The lower- and upper-bound estimates of the terrorism risk compose
the first pair of explanatory variables. The lower-bound variable is always a significant predictor of the best estimate of the terrorism death
toll. The upper-bound estimate is significant only after taking the log
transformation of it and the terrorism death toll, thus muting the influence of the high-end outliers. The magnitudes of the lower-bound coefficients are always greater than the upper-bound coefficients as well.
These results are consistent with the sample statistics in Table 2, which
indicates a much closer relationship of the best estimate to the lowerbound estimate than to the upper-bound estimate.
The third variable in the equation addressed the potential embeddedness effect. It is a dummy variable for the version of the survey in
which respondents were asked to assess the terrorism risk deaths from
multiple sources of risk, not just risks to passengers on airplanes. The
multiple-risk coefficients fail the usual tests of statistical significance in
every instance. Quite simply, respondents do not take into account the
additional risk when multiple risks are considered instead of a single
source of risk. This result reinforces findings about embeddedness.
The September 11 recollection variable takes the value of one when
the ex ante risk estimate at least equals the ex post estimate. This variable
is never statistically significant. Respondents who indicate that they believe the risk is lower or the same as they thought it was before the
September 11 attack do not have lower values for their best estimate of
the terrorism risk than do those who indicate that they have raised their
estimates.'" This provides strong evidence that these people are not resistant learners, as their postattack risk beliefs are no lower than for
respondents who recognize that they have altered their risk assessments.
Table 3 also includes dummy variables for the different survey years,
2003 and 2004; the 2004 dummy variable also serves as a Wharton
School dummy variable, as all respondents in that year were at Wharton.
There is also a dummy variable for the Kennedy School in 2003. The
18. This result also suggests that the people exhibiting September 11 recollection bias
did not misinterpret the question of whether they thought the actual risks were the same
or lower than their perceived risks before September 11.
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omitted dummy variable categories are 2002 and Harvard Law School.
There are no significant year or locale effects. 19

4. SUPPORT FOR ANTITERRORISM RISK POLICIES

4.1. Use of Profiting for Passenger Screening
The principal antiterrorism policy that we analyze is the profiling of
airline passengers on the basis of demographic characteristics to identify
potential terrorist threats on airplanes. In particular, we explore the
extent to which people are willing to trade off additional time waiting
in line for the infringement on civil liberties that such profiling might
represent. The basic survey question mentioned three different periods
of waiting time-10 minutes, 30 minutes, and 60 minutes. In each instance, the respondent could avoid this additional wait in line if a policy
were adopted to screen passengers on the basis of demographic profiling.
In one version of the survey the respondent is told: "You would not
be singled out for such a search based on terrorist risk profiling." In the
second version of the survey, the respondent is told: "You would be
singled out for such searches based on terrorist risk profiling." The exact
wording of the full question for the version in which the subject would
not be singled out for searches follows:
One way of reducing terrorism risks to plane flights is better screening of passengers. The FBI has developed a profile of the chances that a passenger is a
terrorist, taking into account the person's age, race, gender, national origin,

appearance, and baggage. Airlines either could screen all passengers, leading to
additional delays in line, or they could screen passengers based on the terrorist
risk profiling. Targeted screening would reduce the terrorist risk by as much as
random searches, but would involve time delays for passengers. People who are
singled out based on the terrorist risk profiles will have to undergo an extra 10
minutes of searches. You would not be singled out for such racial profiling.
a. Would you favor terrorist risk profiling if the alternative was for you to wait
in line an extra 10 minutes so that all passengers could be screened randomly?
Yes _ No
b. Would you favor terrorist risk profiling if the alternative was for you to wait
in line an extra 30 minutes so that all passengers could be screened randomly?
Yes _ No 19. Since there were no terrorist attacks in the United States between the survey datesa pleasant surprise-we might have expected a decrease in risk estimates. The change was
in the right direction but far from significant.

HeinOnline -- 34 J. Legal Stud. 43 2005

44 / THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES / VOLUME 34 (1)

/ JANUARY 2005

c. Would you favor terrorist risk profiling if the alternative was for you to wait
in line an extra 60 minutes so that all passengers could be screened randomly?
Yes _ No _
Note that respondents are being asked to trade off convenience and
profiling, not safety versus profiling. If freedom from profiling is regarded
as a civil liberty, and if civil liberties are regarded as a fundamental
value, not to be compromised unless some equivalently fundamental
value is at stake, individuals should prefer even the 60-minute wait to
airport profiling. 2" The profiling here reduces inconvenience and does
not increase safety, as the alternative is to screen everyone. However,
the profiling may be more acceptable because it takes place in a safetyrelated context. Still, we found it surprising that three-fourths of our
respondents would allow profiling to avoid imposing a 60-minute wait
on air travelers and that the numbers favoring profiling doubled when
the wait increased from 10 to 60 minutes.
Table 4 summarizes the willingness of respondents to support terrorist
screening policies on the basis of the length of time waiting in line and
on whether the respondent would be affected by this screening policy.
In every instance in this table, the support for targeting increases as the
time waiting in line rises. Indeed, nearly two-fifths of the respondents
change from opposing to favoring profiling as the wait increases. The
civil liberties issue proves important but is not a trumping consideration."
Somewhat surprisingly,' respondents were not generally more willing
to support screening that targets other people rather than themselves.
In the 2002-2004 pooled survey results, for example, when the incremental cost of avoiding targeting was a 10-minute wait, 40 percent of
the passengers supported targeting if the screening affected only others,
20. A more extreme version of this example would highlight the drawbacks to strict
lexicographic preferences. We expect that even staunch civil libertarians might accept profiling rather than a 20-hour wait in line that yielded equivalent safety. By offering three
scenarios-10-, 30-, and 60-minute waits-we may have inadvertently created a frame that
made it acceptable to profile to avoid longer waits.
21. The authors recognize that by giving respondents three different times, they were
to some extent framing a situation in which different answers were reasonable; neither
civil liberties nor safety would be trumping concerns. To explore this possibility, in June
2004 the survey question was run on a sample of 17 judges in a cognitive-interview setting.
That setting allowed respondents to discuss the question and its interpretation. The judges
indicated that their preferences were not affected by the offered ranges. Indeed, 15 of the
17 judges favored profiling even if it saved no time in line, and two of the judges opposed
profiling even if the alternative was to wait an hour in line.
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Table 4. Attitudes toward Use of Terrorism Risk Profiles (Percentage Favoring
Risk Profiting)

Delay in Line Due to
Screening Time
2002 survey:
10 minutes
30 minutes
60 minutes
2003 survey:
10 minutes
30 minutes
60 minutes
2004 survey:
10 minutes
30 minutes
60 minutes
Pooled results:
10 minutes
30 minutes
60 minutes

Screening

Screening

Affects
Only Others

Affects
Respondents

40.91
59.09
77.27

41.46
58.54
65.85

35.19
59.26
75.93

48.89
68.89
80.00

45.24
61.90
66.67

47.83
69.57
76.09

40.00
60.00
73.57

46.21
65.91
74.24

while 46 percent supported screening if it affected the respondents themselves. By the time the additional wait in line reaches an hour, about
three-fourths of all respondents supported screening in each instance.
This pattern indicates that concern for civil liberties is far broader than
mere self-interest. Indeed, some respondents may feel more comfortable
with profiling-which brings efficiency advantages-if they would be a
target, since that defuses the issue of unjust imposition.
The sample used for this survey is far from a random sample of the
U.S. population. If anything, given their fields of study, our respondents
are likely to be less supportive of the practice of profiling than the general
population. Harvard Law School students and Kennedy School of Government students, whose fields are government and public policy, are
likely to be particularly sensitive to civil liberties issues and the importance of preserving civil liberties from unnecessary infringement. One
might suspect that Wharton business school students would be less sensitive to civil liberties, but that in fact was not the case. We expect that
all these groups of students take airplanes much more frequently than
the average American.
Table 5 presents the probit estimates of the probability that an individual with particular characteristics will favor targeting passengers
for screening on the basis of profiling. The first set of estimates in Table
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Table 5. Probit Estimates of the Probability of Favoring Targeting Passengers for Screening
Waiting Time (in Minutes)

Pooled
Estimates
Waiting time
Respondents targeted
for screening
September 11
recollection bias
Best risk estimate
2003
2004 (Wharton)
Female
Nonwhite
U.S. citizen

.0064*
(.0009)

10
.

30

60

. .....

.0607'
(.0361)

.0687
(.0619)

.0812
(.0606)

.0230
(.0550)

-. 0892*
(.0368)
.00004'
(.00002)
.0400
(.0544)
.0611
(.0457)
-. 0548
(.0396)
-. 0918"
(.0419)
.0023
(.0510)

-. 0547
(.0636)
.00004
(.00004)
-. 0076
(.0942)
.0952
(.0805)
-. 0187
(.0676)
-. 1168'
(.0694)
.0065
(.0872)

-. 1008
(.0616)
.00005
(.00004)
.0847
(.0900)
.0925
(.0756)
-. 0732
(.0669)
-. 0941
(.0709)
.0245
(.0863)

-. 0993*
(.0551)
.00003
(.00004)
.0368
(.0825)
-. 0098
(.0702)
-. 0664
(.0613)
-. 0492
(.0641)
-. 0234
(.0762)

Note. All regressions include a variable for whether the respondent is a Kennedy School
student, which is not statistically significant, as well as a constant term. Coefficients are
transformed to reflect marginal probabilities. N = 799 for the pooled estimates. Standard
errors are in parentheses.
* Statistically significant at the 10% level, two-tailed test.
* Statistically significant at the 5% level, two-tailed test.

5 pools the various waiting time observations and includes a variable
for the length of waiting time. The length of the wait is statistically
significant; the coefficient implies that for every additional 10 minutes
of waiting in line, a respondent is 6 percent more likely to favor profiling
passengers for screening purposes.
Respondents who exhibit September 11 recollection bias are 9 percent
less likely to favor targeting of passengers in the pooled estimates and
10 percent less likely to favor targeting in the 60-minute wait situation.
Thus, individuals who do not recognize an increase in terrorist risk since
September 11 are less likely to favor profiling. This is precisely the pattern predicted by recollection choice bias.
This negative linkage between September 11 recollection bias and
willingness to use passenger profiling could be the result of motivated
reasoning. The evidence is consistent with that hypothesis (see Figure
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However, two aspects of the results suggest caution in concluding
that respondents consciously or subconsciously justified their policy positions with faulty risk assessments. First, a more straightforward way
to reject curbs on civil liberties would be to produce low risk estimates.
However, people who exhibit recollection bias did not have lower assessments of current terrorism risk than did people who did not exhibit
recollection bias. Second, even in the context of space shuttle launches,
where the issues are much less charged, many people exhibit recollection
bias. If recollection bias is unaffected by policy preferences, it will still
be correlated with a preference for sticking with the policies preferred
in the past, the pattern we observed.
It is interesting to note that the best risk estimate for an individual
has a statistically significant effect on support for passenger screening,
and the effect is small. A small or zero effect on risk estimates would
be expected if people suffer from probability neglect. As hypothesized
by Sunstein (2003), people facing catastrophic terrorism risks may focus
more on the severity of the outcome than on the probability that it will
occur. The expectation of an additional 1,000 deaths from future terrorism attacks makes respondents only 4 percent more likely to favor
targeting of passengers for screening. It is not the level of risk estimates
that drives support for antiterrorism policies but rather the perception
that we are on a steeper portion of the risk/civil liberties trade-off curve
since September 11. Once again, this result is consistent with the recollection choice bias framework, as outlined in Section 2. People who
do not believe that there has been an upward shift in the risk level are
less supportive of more intrusive passenger screening regardless of the
value of their best risk estimate.
In the pooled and 10-minute regressions, nonwhites are less supportive of profiling. The other demographic variables are never statistically
significant. Other variables that are never statistically significant are the
2003 and 2004 dummy variables and the variable indicating whether
the respondent will or will not be targeted for screening. As in Table 4,
there is no evidence that self-interest influences individuals' trade-off
between civil liberties and waiting time.
An important finding that emerges from these results is consistent
with our hypothesis that an individual displaying recollection bias after
1).22

22. Values and probability assessments are often linked. For example, those who think
capital punishment is immoral also tend to think it is ineffective. Eldar Shafir (personal
communication, May 25, 2004).
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Table 6. Attitude toward Surveillance of Mail, E-Mail, and Phones (Percentage of
Respondents Supporting Policy)

Full sample
Respondents answering
yes to profiling
Respondents answering no
to profiling
Support both profiling and
surveillance
Oppose both profiling and
surveillance
Support profiling but not
surveillance
Support surveillance but
not profiling
September 11 recollection
bias
No September 11
recollection bias

2002
Survey

2003
Survey

2004
Survey

Pooled
Results

36.1

27.6

38.4

33.7

43.3

32.5

41.0

38.4

17.4

9.5

32.0

20.3

31.3

25.5

29.1

28.5

22.9

19.4

19.8

20.6

41.0

53.1

41.9

45.7

4.8

2.0

9.3

5.2

31.9

21.3

36.4

30.2

41.7

33.3

41.9

38.4

Note. The profiling question pertains to respondents who answered yes to profiling to
avoid a 60-minute wait. To be included in any calculations appearing in this table, respondents had to be consistent; for example, if they favored profiling for a 10-minute
wait, they should favor profiling for a 30- or 60-minute wait.

a catastrophic event is less likely to favor an expensive policy shift that
makes that catastrophe less likely in the future.
4.2. Attitudes toward Surveitance Measures
Although the main focus of the survey was on targeting passengers for
airplane screening, the survey also asked about the respondents' support
for various kinds of surveillance measures. In particular, each respondent
in all surveys considered the following question:
Would you support policies that made it easier for legal authorities to read mail,
e-mail, or tap phones without a person's knowledge so long as it was intended
to prevent terrorism? Yes

__

No

__

Table 6 reports the responses to these questions for the 2002 survey,
the 2003 surveys, the 2004 survey, and the pooled results. Every analysis
of the data showed somewhat greater support for these forms of sur-
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veillance in 2002 than in 2003.23 As the September 11 attack receded
into memory and no new attacks took place in the United States, support
for antiterrorism surveillance may have diminished. 24 However, responses for the 2004 full sample and for those who say yes to profiling
at airports are very similar to the answers in 2002.
The pooled results from the surveys for the full sample indicate that
just over one-third of all respondents support surveillance of mail,
e-mail, and telephones. Of those who supported passenger profiling to
avoid a 60-minute wait, 38 percent support surveillance, while among
respondents who opposed such profiling, only 20 percent support surveillance measures. This difference is significant at the 1 percent level
(t = 2.88). As expected, respondents' attitudes toward civil liberties are
consistent in the surveillance and profiling scenarios. Those who showed
recollection bias were less likely to support surveillance (30.2 versus
38.4 percent for those not showing bias). On a one-tailed test, this
difference is significant at the .052 level.
Respondents were much less likely to support surveillance efforts than
profiling. Nevertheless, there is a positive correlation between support
for surveillance policies and support for passenger profiling. Of the sample, 29 percent support both surveillance and passenger screening (based
on the 60-minute wait), and 21 percent of the sample oppose both.
However, among respondents whose attitudes differ for the two forms
of civil liberties infringement, far more support passenger profiling-46
percent versus 5 percent.

2

5. QUALIFICATIONS AND FUTURE ENHANCEMENTS "

Clearly, it would have been desirable to have started our research asking
individuals their terror risk assessments before September 11. Then we
could tell how much their memories shaded their prior beliefs using a
within-subjects format or how their beliefs related to the actual prior
beliefs of matched others in an across-subjects format. Alas, it would
require a supernatural degree of foresight to undertake such before-the23. Conceivably this difference could arise because of a difference in attitudes between
law and Kennedy School of Government students, since the latter were included only in
2003. In fact, a Kennedy School of Government dummy variable proved insignificant.
24. Views may have also changed about government policies, such as the Patriot Act,
which was passed in the interim. The war in Iraq may have also altered attitudes.
25. We thank the editor and the referee for suggesting that we include the material in
this section.
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fact surveys; the study of unique rare bad events will generally remain
retrospective. Recollection bias, with all its challenges, is likely to be a
component of such studies.
Our study had no controls on a variety of variables that would have
provided firmer insights into behavior. For example, a quantitatively
meaningful attitude scale for general preferences for civil liberties would
be useful as a control on respondents' attitudes.26 However, the best
measure of civil liberties preferences is that revealed by attitudes toward
actual policy choices, and the results in this paper present a first step at
developing such trade-off values.
Our sample consisted of 333 individuals. Though this sample size
adequately identifies a number of important relationships, it may be too
small to identify others. Say that the sample consists of one-third As
and two-thirds Bs, where As avoid recollection bias and Bs exhibit it.
Say that we know that As are .5 likely to favor a policy, and we want
to find out whether Bs are different. If the true p for Bs is .6, the likelihood that we reject the null of no difference, that is, the power of the
test, is 84.9 percent.
Most policy discussion in this arena addresses the trade-off between
civil liberties and safety. However, the airport profiling scenario in our
study trades off civil liberties against convenience, not safety. Using actual trade-offs with safety would have provided additional insight, particularly if our interest is fundamental civil liberties.
Fortunately, other inferences are available on the civil liberties/safety
trade-off. If the expected trade-off between convenience and safety is
relatively constant across individuals, then trade-offs between civil liberties and convenience translate to those between civil liberties and
safety. Table 6, which reports acceptance of surveillance, is reassuring
in this regard. Respondents who were willing to permit profiling for
convenience were dramatically more willing to accept surveillance. Thus,
the trade-off between civil liberties and convenience predicted the tradeoff between civil liberties and safety, at least in the context of surveillance. Moreover, in 2002 and 2003, those showing September 11 recollection bias were less likely to support surveillance, which implies a
direct trade-off between safety and civil liberties.
We have sketched a broad set of relationships and drawn inferences
26. We could also directly measure personality differences of our subjects, say, to assess
a relationship with recollection bias. Neither past studies of hindsight bias nor the extremely
weak correlation between September 11 and space shuttle recollection bias suggests that
personality traits would be strong predictors.
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on the basis of survey data. In some contexts, more direct measures of
attitudes and preferences would provide firmer insights. In addition,
since we merely employed a survey, we learn only what people say they
would do, not what they actually would do. However, since the questions
involve public goods and public bads over which individuals do not have
control, for example, risk profiling at airports, we cannot delegate realworld decisions to ordinary citizens and draw inferences from their actual behaviors.

6. CONCLUSION

The September 11 attack dramatically transformed the recognized scale
of terrorism risks facing U.S. citizens. As a result, the policy options
with respect to terrorism risk and civil liberties deteriorated substantially.
Assuming preferences between safety and civil liberties of the usual shape
and that the productivity of antiterror measures increases with the level
of risk, optimal antiterrorism measures after September 11 will be stricter
than those before. Hence, civil liberties will be reduced, but terror risks
are likely to be higher as well.
Among people with common preferences, assuming rational choice,
levels of support for antiterrorism efforts should be positively related to
perceived risks. However, our results indicate that the perceived risk
level is not a predominant factor affecting support. Indeed, it is never
significant in our empirical analyses.
Quite remarkably given the magnitude and surprise of the September
11 attack, 57 percent of respondents exhibited recollection bias: they
stated that the risks were no greater post- than preattack. The current
risk estimates of those exhibiting recollection bias were no lower than
the estimates of those who did not exhibit such bias; the bias was not
due to a failure to perceive the risks after September 11 as others do.
Rather, it was a failure to recognize that they had updated their risk
beliefs, just as others had.
A striking finding is that individuals who suffer recollection bias are
more reluctant than their peers to accept racial profiling or surveillance
policies. We posit that these individuals were internal to or invested in
past choices; they approved of the civil liberties level relative to terrorism
in effect prior to September 11. Since they do not perceive changed risk
levels, they see no need to change their favored policy.
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APPENDIX

We illustrate the differences between hindsight and recollection bias with Figures
Al and A2, which show the two phenomena in schematic form. In the figures,
A represents the actual forward-looking estimate of the risk, H represents a
hypothetical pre-event estimate judged from a postevent position, and R represents the recollection of a pre-event estimate. Judgments by individuals I and
J are indicated by subscripts. The darkened arrows represent the magnitudes of
the two biases.
Figure Al compares I's postevent conjecture of what the risk was pre-event,
which is a hypothetical assessment, and the actual pre-event estimate by person
J. Hindsight bias is the tendency for the postevent estimate to be far higher. The
magnitude of the bias is indicated by the darkened, double-headed arrow. A
famed experimental test of hindsight (see the studies reported in Sunstein et al.
[2002]) had respondents A consider a fictional railroad situation. They were then
asked to assess the accident risk. Respondents B then consider the same situation,
but after an accident has occurred. They are then asked to assess what they
thought the risk was given the information available before the accident. The
actual preaccident risk assessments by respondents A in such experiments are
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well below the hypothetical pre-event risk assessments by respondents B, which
indicates hindsight bias.
The test for recollection bias compares different components. It involves
neither hypothetical judgments nor those by individual J. The test first examines
whether I's forward-looking risk beliefs are in line with external estimates; if
so, I does not merely have low estimates. In Figure A2, the shaded boxes indicate
the estimates by the external environment, including market and government
estimates. The postevent box surrounds the postevent circle, showing that the
individual's current estimates are in line with the external benchmark. If that
test is passed, I's recollection of his pre-event risk estimate is subtracted from
I's current risk estimate. If this difference is well below the external measure of
the increase in risk between the preaccident and postaccident situation, then I
is said to exhibit recollection bias. While railway safety experts will assess the
future risk as being greater than they thought it was before, perhaps because
they learned that the railroad's safety practices were less effective than they
thought, respondent I, who exhibits recollection bias, believes that the prospective risk is that same as he thought it was before the accident.
Figure A2 shows the case where the perceived risk is the same before and
after the low-probability event occurs. Recollection bias is indicated as the dif-
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ference between the increase in risk according to external evidence and the respondent's report of perceived increase in risk. Here again, the darkened, doubleheaded arrow indicates the magnitude of the bias.
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